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Rational Choice Meets the New Politics: Choosing the Scottish Parliament’s 
Electoral System  
 
Although there has been extensive research on electoral system choice at the national 
level, we know relatively little about the dynamics of deciding the rules of the game 
for sub-state institutions. This article examines the factors that influenced the choice 
of a proportional electoral system for the new Scottish Parliament in 1999. Through 
the use of archival sources and interviews with key participants, we challenge the 
conventional rational choice explanation for the adoption of the mixed-member 
proportional (MMP) system. Although rational considerations on the part of the 
Labour Party were involved in the choice of MMP, our findings suggest that, as at the 
national level, theories of electoral system choice need to consider normative values 
as well. 
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The choice of electoral system is one of the most important decisions faced by the 
actors involved in the creation of new political institutions. In the words of Giovanni 
Sartori (1968: 273), the electoral system is ‘the most specific manipulative instrument 
of politics’. Some scholars suggest that such choices on electoral systems may be 
influenced by rational choice considerations, where parties seek to maximize seat 
gains or minimize potential losses (Benoit 2004), or wider interactions with civil 
society and the general public (Renwick 2010). However, while there has been 
extensive research on electoral system change at the national level (Rahat 2011), less 
attention has been paid to choices in sub-state regions. As Monique Leyenaar and 
Reuven Hazan (2011: 441) point out, ‘in the majority of the single case studies on 
electoral reform there is no mention of changes in the electoral process at the local or 
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regional levels, notwithstanding the fact that electoral reform can be quite successful 
at these levels’.  
This article presents one of the first detailed case studies of sub-state electoral 
system choice. It analyses the choice of proportional representation (PR) for the 
Scottish Parliament, a new sub-state institution founded in 1999. However, it has 
wider implications for the literature on electoral system choice and the debate about 
‘new politics’ in Scotland (Mitchell 2010). We show that, as at the national level, the 
choice of electoral system can be a question of ideologies and values beyond rational 
self-interest (Blais, Dobrzynska and Indridason 2005; Lamare and Vowles 1996; 
Carty et al. 2008; Renwick 2007, 2010). Furthermore, the choice of an electoral 
system different from the one used for the UK Parliament – in line with the ‘new 
politics’ goals that those who designed the Scottish Parliament held (Brown 2000) – 
shows that sub-state legislatures do not need to follow the model of their state-level 
counterparts. While occasional deviations from the national system occur, such as in 
Germany, where a minority of Landtag electoral systems are forms of PR differing 
from that used by the Bundestag (Massicotte 2003), it is rare for sub-state legislatures 
to use electoral systems whose principle of representation differs from the national 
model, such as in Australia, where Tasmania’s lower house uses PR rather than a 
majoritarian system (Farrell and McAllister 2006: 47).  
For devolution-seeking Scots creating new institutions, Westminster acted as a 
‘negative template’ (Mitchell 2000: 616), so a different electoral system was required. 
The choice of the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system actually resembles the 
process seen in new democracies, rather than simply mirroring Westminster. 
Ultimately, we argue that, as at the statewide level, explanations for other examples of 
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electoral reform at the sub-state level need also to consider the range of pressures on 
political elites (Rahat 2004; Van der Kolk 2007; Renwick 2010). 
The conventional account of how the architects of Scottish devolution in the 
1990s chose a form of PR for the Scottish Parliament involves a somewhat hidden 
rational choice explanation. Jack McConnell, while Scottish Labour’s general 
secretary, appeared to confirm in a 1997 interview the notion that the new 
parliament’s electoral system was chosen to prevent a future Scottish National Party 
(SNP) victory on a minority of the popular vote (Taylor 1999: 57). However 
compelling the received wisdom may be, this article suggests that a rational choice 
perspective cannot fully explain Labour’s choice. The selection of a PR electoral 
system for the Scottish Parliament was, to a large extent, shaped by the influence of 
civil society and a commitment among the actors involved to a ‘new politics’, 
particularly regarding the role of women in the new institution. Using archival and 
interview sources, along with some quantitative evidence, we argue that while some 
rational choice expectations apply, other perspectives that consider factors that are not 
strictly rational must be taken into account for a full understanding of why PR was 
chosen for the Scottish Parliament. Our account explores the process of elite 
bargaining that took place in the context of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, 
which was largely responsible for the design of the Scottish Parliament. 
The article begins by reviewing the literature on electoral system choice. We 
use this to construct an analytical framework based on two broad perspectives: 
rational choice and an ideological commitment to ‘new politics’. We then examine the 
evidence about the process of choosing the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system in 
light of these perspectives. Finally, we consider the implications of this case study for 
the wider study of electoral system choice. 
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Theoretical approaches to electoral system change 
Much of the scholarly literature on institutional change (or the lack thereof) assumes 
that rational political actors try to maximize their utility – often votes or seats. 
According to the rational choice perspective, parties with a lot of electoral support 
prefer majoritarian electoral systems and small constituencies, while parties with less 
support prefer PR, ideally in large constituencies – as Josep Colomer (2005: 2) puts it, 
‘the large prefer the small, and the small prefer the large’. Small constituencies 
(particularly with plurality or majority electoral rules) create high barriers for 
candidates, favouring larger parties (and smaller parties with highly concentrated 
local support), while large constituencies electing many candidates under PR rules 
lower the threshold and help smaller parties.  
As new parties enter the electoral arena and threaten the established parties 
(perhaps as the suffrage is extended or new issue dimensions develop), the 
establishment might fear that electoral support will flow more heavily to these new 
parties. With majoritarian electoral rules, SMP (single-member plurality, colloquially 
known as ‘first past the post’ in Britain) or the two-round system, the privileged 
classes feared future electoral wipe-out under such winner-take-all systems once mass 
suffrage arrived, leading to the argument that the establishment chose PR to defend 
itself against the socialist threat (Grumm 1958; Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999). Colomer 
(2005: 18) argues that there has been a worldwide trend towards PR as party systems 
have increased in size (despite the use of majoritarian electoral rules) in many 
countries, though if the number of electoral parties (measured by vote share, not seats 
won) remains relatively low, then the pressure for changing to PR will be low (2005: 
14).  
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While institutional approaches emphasizing rational assumptions are very 
common in the literature, some have argued that there are limits to their application to 
real-world cases. The rational choice approach often assumes that parties are unitary 
actors (Downs 1957: 24-25), which may not be the case when factionalism is present, 
and that there is a lack of uncertainty when political actors make their calculations 
(Downs 1957: 77). Unfortunately, in the real world, politics is fluid, so actors might 
not have ‘perfect information’ about their electoral context (Green and Shapiro 1994: 
19), meaning that they can make serious miscalculations when choosing an electoral 
system (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Katz 2005). Gideon Rahat concludes that 
rational choice models do not work well with complex political situations, in which 
there is much uncertainty and instability, and actors are not unitary (2004: 476). 
Indeed, it is much easier to assess actions as rational (or not) after the fact (Rahat 
2006).  
Choices that may appear quite irrational reflect shortcomings in the rational 
choice approach. Alan Renwick points out that recent (post-1962) electoral reforms in 
established democracies actually contradict Colomer’s (2005) argument, with shifts to 
more proportional changes occurring in cases where party systems were smaller than 
where shifts towards less proportional electoral systems took place (Renwick 2010: 
248-249). Jean-Benoit Pilet (2008: 48-49) argues that, contrary to rational 
expectations, the larger parties of Belgium support the PR status quo because they are 
satisfied with the system and are cautious about the uncertainty surrounding 
anticipating what a major upheaval in the electoral system might entail, despite the 
election simulations of political scientists. Other research on the attitudes of 
politicians also indicates that those who win tend to be satisfied with the system 
(Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2006).  
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Another constraint on rational action is whether the system change that is 
proposed by elites is actually perceived as legitimate by the wider public. Matthew 
Shugart (2008: 10) argues that ‘it is precisely at the intersection of normative critiques 
of the existing rules and rational interest of political actors that reform is most likely 
to occur’, with political actors seeing electoral reform as a selling point. While much 
of the current research into electoral system choice focuses on recent case studies, this 
question of the democratic character of various electoral systems is quite an old one. 
In the early twentieth-century European context, André Blais and his colleagues argue 
that the transition to PR was not always a defence mechanism against socialism: the 
widespread ‘view that PR was the only truly “democratic” system that ensured the fair 
representation of various viewpoints’ also mattered (Blais, Dobrzynska and 
Indridason 2005: 189).  
 In other words, there are values beyond those linked to seeking power that 
motivate political actors; as Renwick (2010: 37-46) argues, principles associated with 
democracy, stability, governance, policy outcomes, constituency service, identity and 
practicability may drive electoral reform. Furthermore, while electoral reform is often 
seen as a strictly elite affair, Renwick (2011: 457) points out that the wider public 
might get involved in the process, noting that much reform activity takes place in 
between the two extremes of mass imposition (involving the public in some way) or 
elite imposition (where politicians can introduce the electoral system of their choice 
without having to take significant account of others’ views). While Renwick 
concludes that power-seeking elite preferences matter when studying the reasons for 
electoral reform, he argues that other values held by elites – and the wider public – 
can influence the process. In addition, Renwick points out that while Colomer’s 
(2005) argument that places with larger party systems are more likely to adopt PR 
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does not stand up well when analysing events in established democracies, it does 
apply much better to new democracies (Renwick 2010: 250-251). 
 
The creation of the Scottish Parliament and ‘new politics’: two conflicting 
perspectives 
 
Between 1999 and 2007, Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats 
governed together in coalitions. They had previously participated in the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, during which the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system 
was deliberated over and ultimately chosen. The system was to embody six criteria 
that would reflect a ‘new politics’ distinct from Westminster’s supposedly less 
enlightened model: 
that it produces results in which the number of seats for various parties is 
broadly related to the number of votes cast for them; that it ensures, or at least 
takes effective positive action to bring about, equal representation of men and 
women, and encourages fair representation of ethnic and other minority 
groups; that it preserves a link between the member and his/her constituency; 
that it is as simple as possible to understand; that it ensures adequate 
representation of less populous areas; and that the system is designed to place 
the greatest possible power in the hands of the electorate. (Scottish 
Constitutional Convention 1992: 91-92) 
 
The above criteria are difficult to maximize simultaneously, but a working group took 
advice from electoral systems experts, civil society groups and political parties. The 
Liberal Democrats wanted PR in the form of the preferential single transferable vote 
(STV) and Labour was reluctant to accept any form of PR, while the Scottish Greens 
wanted PR in the form of the additional member system (AMS), based upon the West 
German Bundestag’s electoral system (Jones 1992: 76-77).  
AMS is known as the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system by most 
political scientists, who have adopted the name used by New Zealand, which 
introduced this system of PR for parliamentary elections in 1996. In MMP systems, 
some representatives are elected in single-member constituencies while others are 
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elected from regional or national party lists, with the latter compensating, on a 
partisan basis, for disproportionality arising from the constituency races so that the 
overall result (adding constituency and list representatives together) is proportional on 
a partisan basis (Lijphart 2012; Reynolds et al. 2005; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). 
We analyse the process of electoral system choice using two broad 
perspectives: rational choice and ideological commitment to ‘new politics’. 
 
Perspective one: Rational choice 
While it is clear that there was a compromise between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats on the final form of PR selected for the Scottish Parliament (Curtice 1996), 
the bigger question is how PR came to be accepted by Labour at all. One perspective 
on this electoral system choice follows the rational choice logic associated with the 
Labour Party’s position in the 1990s. In Scotland, multiparty politics has been around 
since the 1970s in the form of moderate pluralism (Bennie and Clark 2003: 153), a 
result of both socioeconomic class and what some scholars see as a national identity 
‘group loyalty’ or issue dimension (Brand et al. 1983: 464) or what others label the 
centre–periphery cleavage (Bohrer II and Krutz 2005: 665).  
 Colomer’s rational choice-based expectation of change to PR when the party 
system gets large – about four effective parties, calculated from vote share (Laasko 
and Taagepera 1979) – may work well in newly democratizing countries, but does not 
fit the evidence when looking at recent cases of electoral system change in established 
democracies, where about half the changes were neutral or towards less proportional 
systems, and some of these happened with large party systems (including Italy and 
Japan), while New Zealand’s shift to MMP happened with only 2.8 effective parties 
(Renwick 2010: 248-249). Nevertheless, if Scotland is considered to be an example of 
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a new democracy, or at least if the Scottish Parliament is a new democratic institution 
in an existing democracy, it is appropriate to examine the relevant quantitative 
evidence, in the form of election results, as we do in the next section. 
Concern about the longer-term consequences of electoral outcomes might also 
have played a part in Labour’s decision to replace the SMP system used to elect 
Scotland’s local councils with STV. The decision was made under pressure from 
Labour’s coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, who would not have renewed the 
coalition if Labour had reneged on its promise (Denver and Bochel 2007: 2). This 
desire to remain in power with the Liberal Democrats might not have been the only 
motivation for changing from SMP, a system that helped Labour win huge seat 
majorities on many Scottish councils, to STV, a PR system likely to reduce its seat 
numbers (although the relatively low district magnitude of three or four councillors 
per ward to be used in the new STV system was favourable to larger parties like 
Labour and would soften the blow somewhat).  
 Furthermore, in addition to electoral considerations, Labour also had to 
consider the future of the UK. The selection of a majoritarian electoral system could, 
according to the received wisdom, have allowed for the future possibility of a 
majority SNP government committed to Scottish independence. This perspective 
differs from that held by Labour during the run-up to the 1979 referendum that would 
have established a Scottish Assembly, when the consequences of a plurality-elected 
body eventually yielding an SNP majority were ignored or not taken seriously 
(Proctor 1977: 193). Labour in the 1990s apparently looked ahead to the possibility of 
its electoral success running out and opted for long-term safety, for itself and for the 
UK. This would fit with James Mitchell’s (2010) view that the ‘new politics’ in 
Scotland was more rhetorical than real. 
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Perspective two: Ideological commitment to ‘new politics’ 
An alternate perspective on the choice of the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system 
more closely follows Renwick’s (2010) arguments about the need to take account of 
the role of both politicians and the public when it comes to electoral reform. Thus, 
Scottish political elites in the period before devolution interacted closely with civil 
society groups wanting to improve Scottish democracy. Critical of the majoritarian 
values (Cole 1999) associated with Westminster, a ‘new politics’ would be facilitated 
by a Scottish Parliament with a very different architecture (Brown 2000). The 
outcome would more closely resemble what Arend Lijphart (2012) calls the 
consensus model of democracy, departing from the majoritarian (or Westminster) 
model.  
Therefore, the desire to introduce a different form of politics in Scotland 
tempered the more rational seat maximization strategy Labour could have taken. 
‘There can be few examples of a party in power at national level legislating to 
introduce a sub-national level of government which it would be unlikely ever to 
control. Whatever accusations might be levelled at the Labour Party in terms of the 
devolution settlement, self-interest should not be among them’, former Labour 
member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) Mike Watson declared (2001: 4). Thus, 
while Labour had concerns about the potential for the SNP to win a majority of seats 
in a Scottish Parliament elected by SMP and advance its separatist agenda at some 
point in the future, Labour agreed to PR primarily because the party wanted the new 
parliament to differ from its Westminster counterpart by reflecting ‘new politics’ 
values. 
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Methods and data 
 
We test the relative persuasiveness of the above perspectives using a range of sources. 
The main source of data is the archive of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, held 
at the National Library of Scotland (NLS GD489: Records of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention 1989-1996). We use this to map the sequence of events 
and to provide an account of decision-making that could be compared with other 
sources. We also examine the reports released by political parties and the secondary 
literature about the creation of the Scottish Parliament and triangulate (Rothbauer 
2008: 893) our findings from archival and secondary sources with new interviews 
(conducted 2014-2016) with politicians and members of the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (and later Commission). We interviewed Jim (now Lord) Wallace (then 
leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats), Jack (now Lord) McConnell (then general 
secretary of the Scottish Labour Party) and Murray (now Lord) Elder (then a senior 
adviser to the Labour shadow secretary of state for Scotland, Donald Dewar). In 
addition, we interviewed two academic advisers to the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (who remain anonymous) and two members of the Scottish Constitutional 
Commission (its chair, Joyce McMillan, and John Lawrie). 
Following Rahat’s (2011) advice, we use both rational choice and historical-
comparative approaches in our analysis in an example of process tracing, defined as 
‘the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a 
case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal 
mechanisms that might causally explain the case’ (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 7). 
Although much of the data analysed is qualitative in nature, some quantitative 
evidence, in the form of election results from the era, will be used. 
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The basic architecture of the Scottish Parliament was designed before the 
Labour government came to power in 1997, through the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention which was founded in 1989. It involved civil society groups, church 
leaders and politicians. The SNP and the then-governing Conservatives did not 
participate, but the Convention included Scotland’s two other main political parties, 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats. After taking power, Labour accepted the 
Convention’s recommendation of MMP for the Scottish Parliament in the Scotland 
Act 1998.  
 
Labour’s calculations 
As noted above, Labour could have expected, at least initially, to do very well in 
Scottish Parliament elections under SMP. Yet the conventional explanation of 
Labour’s acceptance of PR – that the party feared a future electoral shift towards the 
SNP that would be magnified by SMP into a seat majority – involves longer-term 
considerations that included an expectation of declining support and a larger effective 
number parties (ENP) based on vote share (Colomer 2005: 18). There is some 
evidence of both a decline in Labour’s support and a more crowded party system in 
the local election results from the time of the introduction of unitary authorities in 
1995 (Table 1). Labour’s vote share at local elections Scotland-wide declined from 
43.8 per cent in that year to 32.6 per cent in 2003, the last year SMP was used. 
Furthermore, the ENP rose from 3.5 to 4.8 in this period, as Table 1 shows, 
suggesting that Colomer’s argument (2005) about increased multipartyism and the 
fear of future defeat could have played a role in Labour’s acceptance of STV for local 
elections in the second Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition government after 
devolution. 
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<Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
The evidence supporting a rational choice explanation for PR in Scottish 
Parliament elections, however, is less convincing. The ENP figures from election 
results for Scotland’s Westminster seats, from 1970 to 1992 (the last election held 
before Labour agreed to PR for the Scottish Parliament), do reveal the rise of 
multiparty politics in Scotland. Table 2 shows the ENP in 1970 at 2.8, rising to 3.4 in 
both 1974 elections, dropping slightly to 3.2 in 1979, but rising again to 3.6 in 1983 
and staying at this level in 1992 (despite falling back slightly to 3.4 in 1987).  
<Table 3 about here> 
This level of multipartyism, however, is not quite up to the four effective 
parties that Colomer (2005: 8) argues constitute the threshold for a change to a 
proportional or mixed system. Furthermore, while Labour’s vote share in Scotland 
declined somewhat during this period, the Conservatives’ share dropped considerably, 
and the support for the SNP and Liberal Democrats (and their predecessors, the 
Liberals and the Social Democratic Party) was quite volatile, as Table 3 illustrates. 
This parliamentary electoral context did not show Labour in any danger of imminent 
decline and the level of multipartyism was within the tolerance limit for the 
continuation of a majoritarian electoral system suggested by Colomer (2005: 8).  
From a rational seat maximization point of view, therefore, Labour should 
have insisted on SMP for the Scottish Parliament, but this was not the case. There 
were, firstly, practical concerns about the Scottish Constitutional Convention itself. 
Labour wanted to keep a broad consensus behind the proposals; as Gerry Hassan and 
Eric Shaw (2012: 58) point out, ‘without it there was the risk the Lib Dems might 
withdraw, leaving the Convention looking even more like a Labour talking shop’. 
Lord Elder subsequently confirmed that this was a key consideration of Donald 
 14 
Dewar and the Scottish Labour leadership at that time (interview, 2016). For Lord 
Wallace, ‘the Labour Party always knew they would have to concede the principle to 
get this off the ground’ (interview, 2016). 
 Secondly, although it was not a central concern, there is some evidence that 
Labour perceived that PR might prevent the SNP governing in the future Scottish 
Parliament on a minority of the vote (Taylor 1999: 56-57). Thus, for Liberal 
Democrat MP Malcolm Bruce, ‘There was a combination of…not exactly blackmail, 
let’s call it hard bargaining … plus evidence that PR would be helpful’ (quoted in 
Taylor 1999: 57). However, Lord Elder said that this was not an overriding concern 
for himself or Donald Dewar, then the shadow secretary of state for Scotland 
(interview, 2016). 
However, thirdly, beyond these practical concerns there was also recognition 
that the party wanted the Scottish Parliament to be different from Westminster. Lord 
McConnell said: 
It was perceived that the additional member system for electing the Scottish 
Parliament would ensure that no party could dominate the parliament on a 
minority of votes in Scotland… However, the clear purpose of the AMS at the 
time, to ensure that the Scottish Parliament was more representative of 
political opinion generally than would have been the case under first past the 
post, has been achieved over the past four elections. (interview, 2015) 
 
Previously he had commented that ‘Gradually the Labour Party in Scotland moved in 
the direction of AMS because there were people who believed it was the right system 
and others who believed it was a compromise which could be accepted by everybody 
who was in favour of devolution in Scotland’ (quoted in Thomson 2009: 73). Labour 
conceded the principle of PR due to a variety of concerns and seat maximization 
considerations did not entirely trump the others. The exact form of PR that was 
adopted had to be subsequently hammered out through elite bargaining among the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention’s participants. 
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The Scottish Constitutional Convention and Commission 
Although the principle of PR was accepted in the original report of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, there was no agreement on its precise form, so the 
Convention established a Scottish Constitutional Commission in 1993 to look into 
this matter. The Commission eventually selected MMP as a compromise between two 
competing forces: the commitment to a new form of politics (defined, in particular, in 
contrast to the majoritarian Westminster system) and the need to secure the approval 
of the Labour Party, for whom the adoption of PR would involve a measure of 
electoral self-sacrifice. Thus, MMP was the only form of PR that would be acceptable 
to Labour. Such a compromise may be characterized as ‘satisficing’ – it involved 
finding a mid-point between optimization and pragmatism (Simon 1956). For both 
Joyce McMillan and Lord Elder (interviews, 2016), MMP was attractive because it 
retained a strong single-member constituency element. STV, consisting entirely of 
multi-member constituencies, appeared much more radical. 
The Scottish Constitutional Convention was forged in the context of a 
Conservative UK government whose claims to legitimacy were under pressure in 
Scotland. Voting patterns in Scotland and England diverged increasingly throughout 
the 1980s. The Conservative vote share generally went down in Scotland while the 
share for other parties rose. However, the ‘union state’ structure of the UK (Watts 
2007), in which territorial diversity was accommodated through the organs of central 
government, meant that Scotland continued to be governed by the UK government 
through the secretary of state for Scotland. The SMP electoral system gave the 
Conservatives a UK-wide seat majority in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992. Through 
territorial management that critics found to be inept (Mitchell 1990), the 
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Conservatives were increasingly perceived as a threat to Scottish distinctiveness at a 
time when Scottish identity was becoming more important.  
 Thus, for the members of the Convention, the whole ‘Westminster’ system 
(including its majoritarian, confrontational elements and its electoral system) was 
increasingly discredited and associated with an old-fashioned style of politics that was 
insensitive to Scottish distinctiveness and alien to a more ‘consensual’ Scottish 
tradition. From the outset, it sought to define its proposals against the metonym 
‘Westminster’. It also included a variety of participants determined to use the 
convention to further their aim of introducing greater pluralism to Scottish democracy, 
with women’s groups especially prominent. This was consistent with the wider aims 
of a ‘new politics’ that was more consensual, diverse and inclusive, a move away 
from the male-dominated, majoritarian House of Commons (Brown 2000; Mitchell 
2000). 
The Convention’s electoral system criteria, as noted above, called for equal 
representation of men and women in the Scottish Parliament (Scottish Constitutional 
Convention 1992: 91-92). Scottish Labour also demanded this, with the Scottish 
Labour Conference in 1990 calling for equality (Labour Party, Scottish Council 1991). 
There was an attempt to make equal representation for women a statutory requirement, 
with a member of the Convention’s Working Group on the Electoral System, Isobel 
Lindsay, pushing for this in her letter to the Convention’s secretary; she proposed that 
parties failing to nominate equal numbers of male and female candidates be denied 
‘additional member’ (party list) seats (Lindsay 1992). 
However, in the words of one academic participant (interviewed in 2014 and 
who wishes to remain anonymous), there was a clash of two cultures in some of these 
discussions. On the one hand, all of those in the Convention were convinced that 
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Scotland’s place in the UK on these terms was damaging and unsustainable. However, 
while they were rhetorically committed to ‘new politics’, they were not all convinced 
that PR was required to achieve it. In particular, sections of the Labour Party were 
strongly against the introduction of a new electoral system that would involve them 
diluting their electorally strong position in Scotland. Malcolm Bruce, then leader of 
the Scottish Liberal Democrats, noted that ‘Some of the Labour MPs and party 
activists seemed to be asking themselves, “Why are we dealing with the bloody 
Liberals?”’ (quoted in Taylor 1999: 54). Within Scottish Labour, a group set up by 
George Foulkes opposed the party’s drift towards PR, though Foulkes ended his two-
year PR opposition in December 1991 (Macwhirter 1991).  
The Convention, therefore, had to find a path between these perspectives in 
order to secure consensus. The Liberal Democrats and the Greens argued strongly in 
favour of PR while Labour initially opposed it. In a mailing to all Convention 
members, the Scottish Green Party’s pamphlet entitled Fair Votes for Scotland 
invoked fairness, not only in terms of proportionality, but also of women’s 
representation, noting that ‘the geographical link between voter and MP is retained, 
and smaller parties can gain representation (Scottish Green Party 1990). Scottish 
Labour’s executive committee saw that in the party there was ‘no enthusiasm for 
reform based entirely on a list system, with no constituency base and all the elected 
Members dependent for their success on their Party list position. Equally there is 
virtually no backing for the Single Transferable Vote, which is seen as destroying the 
link between the elected Member and his or her constituency’ (Labour Party, Scottish 
Council 1991). Scottish Labour’s opposition to STV put the party into conflict with 
its Convention partner, the Liberal Democrats, who strongly favoured this preferential 
system (Scottish Liberal Democrats 1993).  
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Due to the above differences among the parties, only the principle of PR, and 
not the specific form, was conceded by the Convention in 1992. Its final report 
contained an entire section entitled ‘Making the Scottish Parliament Truly 
Representative’, in which SMP was heavily criticized by references to how it was 
possible for a member of parliament ‘to be returned with little more than one third of 
the votes cast’ and that ‘Mrs Thatcher has dominated for a decade although in the 
most respectable of her three election victories her Party polled only 42% of the vote 
and a very much smaller share of the qualified electorate’ (Scottish Constitutional 
Convention 1992: 91). The Convention report did not decide upon a specific form of 
PR, however, allowing itself some leeway by calling for a system that ‘produces 
results in which the number of seats for various parties is broadly related to the 
number of votes cast for them’ (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1992: 91) and the 
number of MSPs was not specified. 
 The remaining differences over the electoral system had to be resolved by the 
Scottish Constitutional Commission, appointed by the Convention in October 1993. 
Its terms of reference included taking the six electoral system principles agreed by the 
Convention and then choosing an electoral system,  
based upon the following key points which in themselves represent a 
substantial advance towards a new and fairer electoral system for Scotland:– 
(a) the need to move towards a closer correspondence between seats and 
votes; (b) acceptance of an Additional Member System (AMS) as the means 
of achieving this; and (c) acceptance of a statutory obligation on parties to put 
forward equal numbers of men and women candidates, and acceptance also 
that the Additional Member System should be used to achieve gender equality 
if not achieved by the constituency elections. (Scottish Constitutional 
Commission 1993) 
 
These three points moved on from the Convention’s principles. One major point of 
contention was over a statutory requirement (point (c) above) for gender equality, 
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which nearly led to the Liberal Democrats, who opposed the proposal, walking out of 
the Convention in November 1993 (Clark 1993). 
 The Commission reported in 1994 and noted the emerging consensus about 
MMP, but left the system’s mechanics open for further discussion. In particular, there 
were still disagreements about the size of the parliament and the balance between 
constituency and list members. An agreement was eventually hammered out between 
Jim Wallace and George Robertson, then a Labour MP and shadow secretary of state 
for Scotland, at the home of Menzies Campbell, then a Liberal Democrat MP, in 
Edinburgh. Wallace and Robertson agreed to a compromise between their different 
positions on size (the Liberal Democrats wanted 145; Labour wanted 112) and arrived 
at a parliament elected by MMP with 129 members. Wallace recalls: ‘George and I 
looked at each other and said “yeah, let’s just split the difference” … So that’s how 
we got 129’ (interview, 2016). This compromise was included in the final report of 
the Scottish Constitutional Convention (1996) and implemented by the Labour 
government elected in 1997. The developments in this long process are summarized 
in Table 4. 
<Table 4 near here> 
 
Implications for electoral system choice theory 
The analysis presented here chimes with previous studies that have emphasized the 
need to move beyond strictly rational choice explanations for electoral system change. 
MMP was chosen for the Scottish Parliament as a result of both rational choice 
(Labour trying to prevent a future SNP majority) and ideological considerations (the 
Scottish Parliament defining itself against Westminster’s majoritarian politics). We 
therefore categorize the choice of MMP as an example of elite imposition, where 
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politicians can introduce the electoral system of their choice without having to take 
significant account of others’ views (Renwick 2011: 457). 
Although the Scottish Constitutional Convention was an instance of a civil 
society-led process driving reforms beyond the influence of politicians, it implicitly 
accepted the requirement to secure the backing of (particularly Labour) party elites. 
Moreover, its membership was not randomly representative in the manner of a 
citizens’ assembly. Its recommendation of MMP did not emerge out of a strong desire 
from the public for PR. While a proportional electoral system at the UK level would 
have reduced some of the territorial divergence exaggerated by SMP (by, for instance, 
giving the Conservatives more seats in Scotland), the real desire that the Convention 
channelled was for some form of devolution of power. The anomaly of continuing to 
be governed by a party that did not have majority support in Scotland and whose vote 
share was declining was not to be corrected by a change in the electoral system, but 
by the introduction of a Scottish Parliament. Although, as the Conservatives predicted, 
this led to other anomalies in the British constitution, it solved the problem of Scottish 
domestic policies being decided by a party perceived to lack a democratic mandate. 
 Thus, it is difficult to argue that MMP emerged as a result of elite engagement 
with an electorate or civil society demanding PR. Instead, it emerged from elite 
bargaining about how far, on the one hand, proponents (particularly women’s groups) 
of a ‘new politics’ could reasonably be asked to dilute their ideas and, on the other 
hand, how far it was reasonable to ask Scottish Labour to engage in what many in the 
party saw as electoral self-harm. Labour elites wanted to go along with the spirit of 
the Convention; other members of the Convention, conscious of Labour’s electoral 
dominance and that it would likely be the party of government that came to 
implement devolution, wanted to help them carry their party with them. Devolution 
 21 
on these terms, with Labour bound into the process, was a better prospect than 
devolution designed solely by Labour after the party entered government. Labour was 
also conscious of the need to keep a broad base of support for devolution (Interview 
with Lord Elder, 2016). 
 MMP for the Scottish Parliament was, therefore, an elite-imposed reform. In 
Renwick’s (2011) terms, it is an example of a mixture of elite settlement and elite 
bargain. There was a two-stage process of principle and mechanics. First, Labour 
politicians in the Convention viewed some form of PR for the Scottish Parliament as a 
‘generally good’ principle that would differentiate it from Westminster. This also 
coincided with some longer-term Labour thinking about the dangers for the Union of 
a future SNP majority, but, as we have demonstrated, this was not the primary 
motivation. Second, when deciding the exact form of PR, politicians thought about 
their own interests. By choosing MMP with its closed-list PR component, rather than 
the preferential STV form of PR, parties would retain more control over the 
candidates to be elected. They also preserved a strong constituency link that reflected 
their British view of how democracy should work.  
 Overall, the same dynamics found by scholars at the national level applied 
here to this sub-state case. Seat maximization is one of several priorities for political 
elites and may not necessarily trump other political and, crucially, normative concerns. 
In this case, moreover, the subsequent majority won by the SNP in 2011 demonstrates 
that politicians’ best-laid plans can be disrupted by the electorate and by not fully 
grasping the implications of PR. In choosing a sub-state electoral system, perceptions 
of the quality of governance at the national level also feed into normative 
considerations about democracy. Is the national system a model to be copied or can a 
diverging system be used as a badge of distinctiveness and a break with the past?  
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Conclusions 
We have sought to account for the choice of the MMP electoral system for the 
Scottish Parliament and to place this in the wider context of theories of electoral 
system choice. Firstly, we have provided a revisionist account of the process that led 
the Convention and the Labour Party to adopt MMP. The widely quoted McConnell 
remark about preventing the SNP winning a majority is at best a partial explanation. It 
is probable that this remark was directed in part for an internal audience in the Labour 
Party – to reassure sceptical elements and provide a justification for giving away their 
likely dominance under a majoritarian system. Similarly, the widespread 
interpretation in the media (particularly after the 2011 Scottish elections) that MMP 
‘backfired’ because it was adopted as an electoral system ‘designed to prevent a 
(nationalist) majority’ is also somewhat wide of the mark. MMP was adopted because 
of a mixture of ideology and pragmatism: the Convention concluded that it was the 
strongest form of PR that would be acceptable to Labour and in turn, Labour accepted 
it because it fitted with the ‘new politics’ aspirations of the Parliament, believing it 
was a form of PR that could plausibly be sold to party members. 
Secondly, therefore, we argue that the choice of MMP for the Scottish 
Parliament is an example of elite bargaining. After the principle of PR had been 
conceded due to a more ideological commitment to a different type of democracy for 
Scotland (in contrast with Westminster), the political parties implemented a system 
that most closely reflected their preferences. 
Finally, this was a case of the creation of a new democratic institution in an 
old democracy. It does not, therefore, quite fit into the previous categories of electoral 
system change suggested by scholars in this field. On the one hand, it is a moment of 
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transition in which we would expect to find an increased likelihood of change 
(Renwick 2011: 460). On the other hand, it involved the same political elite actors 
who participated in the majoritarian House of Commons and who would compete 
electorally in any new system. Future research into other similar sub-state cases of 
new institutions should confirm whether we ought to view such instances primarily 
through the lens of ‘old democracies’, where we would expect change to be difficult 
(Renwick 2011: 470), ‘new (sub-state) democracies’, where institutions are in flux 
(Rahat and Hazan 2011: 450), or a new category altogether where a distinct set of 
hybrid dynamics apply. 
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Table 1 
Effective Number of Parties (ENP), Scottish Unitary Local Authority Elections, 1995–
2003 (% vote shares below party names) 
 
Year ENP Labour Conservative Scottish National 
Party 
Liberal/Alliance/ 
Liberal Democrat 
1995 3.5 43.8 11.3 26.2 9.7 
1999 3.9 36.6 13.7 28.9 13.6 
2003 4.8 32.6 15.1 24.0 14.6 
 
Sources: Election data: McConnell (2004: 139). Calculations of ENP by the authors. 
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Table 2 
Effective Number of Parties (ENP), Scottish Voting in UK House of Commons 
Elections, 1970–92 
 
Year 1970 1974(Feb) 1974(Oct) 1979 1983 1987 1992 
ENP 2.8 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.6 
 
Sources: Election data: Bennie et al. (1997: 50). Calculations of ENP by the authors. 
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Table 3 
Vote Shares (%) for Parties Gaining More than 1% of the Vote, Scottish Voting in UK 
House of Commons elections, 1970–92 
 
Year Labour Conservative Scottish National Party Liberal/Alliance/ 
Liberal Democrat 
1970 44.5 38.0 11.4 5.5 
1974 (Feb) 36.6 32.9 21.9 8.0 
1974 (Oct) 36.3 24.7 30.4 8.3 
1979 41.5 31.4 17.3 9.0 
1983 35.1 28.4 11.7 24.5 
1987 42.4 24.0 14.0 19.2 
1992 39.0 25.7 21.5 13.1 
 
Source: Bennie et al. (1997:50). 
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Table 4 
Timeline of Developments in the Choice of MMP 
1989 Foundation of the Scottish Constitutional Convention 
1990 Scottish Labour Executive Committee accepts the principle of PR 
for a Scottish Parliament 
1992 Convention publishes draft scheme for a Scottish Parliament, 
including the principle of PR but not the exact form 
1993 Formation of Scottish Constitutional Commission to consider the 
electoral system 
1994 Publication of the report of the Scottish Constitutional 
Commission, which noted a preference for ‘AMS’ but 
disagreement about how it should operate 
1995 Informal discussions between senior Labour and Liberal 
Democrat politicians alight upon the compromise of 73 
constituency members and 56 list members 
1995 Publication of the final Convention report, Scotland’s 
Parliament, Scotland’s Right, recommending the MMP 
compromise 
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